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Since the introduction of the decoy-state technique, phase-randomised weak coherent light pulses
have been the key to increase the practicality of quantum-based communications. Their ultra-fast
generation was accomplished via compact gain-switched (GS) lasers, leading to high key rates in
quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, the question arose of whether the same laser could
be employed to achieve high-speed measurement-device-independent-QKD, a scheme that promises
long-haul quantum communications immune to all detector attacks. For that, a challenging high-
visibility interference between independent picosecond optical pulses is required. Here, we answer the
above question in the affirmative by demonstrating high-visibility interference from two independent
GS lasers triggered at 1GHz. The result is obtained through a careful characterization of the laser
frequency chirp and time jitter. By relating these quantities to the interference visibility, we obtain
a parameter-free verification of the experimental data and a numerical simulation of the achievable
key rates. These findings are beneficial to other applications making use of GS lasers, including
random number generation and standard QKD.
Interference lies at the heart of quantum information
technologies. Novel protocols and schemes, such as quan-
tum cryptography [1], quantum teleportation [2], quan-
tum repeaters [3], or linear optics quantum computing [4]
rely upon high visibility interference of light pulses. To
achieve high visibility, the interfering pulses need to be
indistinguishable in all possible degrees of freedom [5–9].
Weak coherent states of light have been long used to
approximate single photon sources in quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD). This approximation guarantees high
key rates if the decoy-state technique [10, 11] is adopted.
However, in order to apply it, the electromagnetic phase
of coherent states is required to be random. Thankfully,
semiconductor gain-switched (GS) laser diodes naturally
generate optical pulses with random phases [12, 13].
With a sufficient off period between subsequent events,
each laser pulse is triggered by quantum-mechanical
spontaneous emission and thus has random electromag-
netic phase [12]. At the same time, GS short pulses
(around 30 ps, see Fig. 1(a)) are perfectly suited to high
bit rate [14, 15] and noise-tolerant QKD [16]. This is
remarkable given that time-jitter in GS lasers is about
10 ps, i.e., comparable to the pulse width. Furthermore,
other potential sources of impairment like the pulses
spectral distinguishability or a time-varying polarization,
play only a minor role in standard QKD, where each gen-
erated pulse only interferes with itself to deliver a bit of
the final key.
The situation is dramatically changed in measurement-
device-independent-QKD (MDI-QKD), a recent quan-
tum protocol promising immunity against all detector
attacks [17–21]. Similarly to conventional QKD, decoy
states and phase randomization are also required in MDI-
QKD. However, in this case, the successful distillation of
the final key requires high visibility two pulse interfer-
ence [17]. This poses stringent requirements on the sys-
tem, as the interfering pulses have to be indistinguish-
able and perfectly overlapped to guarantee high visibil-
ity. Time jitter and frequency profile of the pulses play a
very important role and it is unclear whether GS lasers
represent a viable solution.
Until now it has not been possible to use GS pulses
shorter than 2 ns and trigger rates higher than 1 MHz
in an MDI-QKD experiment [20]. This is still orders of
magnitude away from high bit-rate QKD[15, 22], work-
ing at 1 GHz with pulse widths of tens of ps. The tol-
erance to time and frequency fluctuations could be im-
proved by using the steady-state emission of GS laser
diodes [12]. However, this would limit the prospect for
high bit rate applications. Other MDI-QKD demonstra-
tions [18, 19, 21] have improved the spectral stability
of the pulses approximating the required source with
continuous-wave (CW) lasers pulse-carved by an inten-
sity modulator. Light pulses generated this way exhibit
a negligible time-jitter, but also a constant, or slowly
variable, phase, therefore violating the phase randomness
requirement. Phase randomisation via separate modula-
tion is possible [21, 23], but at the expense of additional
complexity of the setup [24].
Here, we investigate the relation between GS laser
diodes and interference visibility and implement a so-
lution to mitigate the detrimental effect of pulse distin-
guishability. By introducing a novel theoretical model,
we identify frequency chirp of GS pulses as the main
cause of poor interference visibility. Frequency chirp is
common in fast-driven semiconductor laser diodes [25].
The rapid change in carrier density in the active region
dynamically alters the refractive index thus chirping the
laser frequency [26] and making the pulses far from trans-
form limited [27] (see, e.g., Fig. 1(b)). The concomitant
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2FIG. 1. (a) Temporal and (b) spectral profiles of the two
GS lasers used in this work’s experimental apparatus. (c)
Interference output traces recorded by an oscilloscope and
two fast photodiodes (D0 and D1).
time jitter then prevents two chirped pulses from preserv-
ing a constant phase relation, which is a prerequisite for
high-visibility interference. We verify this analysis by ex-
perimentally interfering short optical pulses emitted by
two independent semiconductor GS laser diodes driven
at 1 GHz and comparing the results with the theoretical
prediction. When frequency chirp is taken into account,
the theory provides a parameter-free fit of the experimen-
tal data, thus confirming the soundness of our analysis.
This fact was then exploited to calibrate our system and
achieve two-pulse interference visibility as high as 0.46,
close to the theoretical limit 0.50 achievable with weak
coherent states [6]. Combined with the intrinsic phase
randomness of the pulses and the high trigger rate of
the laser, this result demonstrates the usefulness of GS
laser diodes in achieving high speed decoy-state MDI-
QKD. Furthermore, it has implications for other types
of high-speed quantum information applications, as dis-
cussed later on.
We start our analysis by describing the schematics
of the experimental setup, depicted in Fig. 2, based on
which we develop our theoretical model. The setup con-
sists of a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer [5], with two
attenuated GS distributed feedback laser diodes injecting
light into a beam splitter through a pair of optical circula-
tors and a tunable filter. After the beam splitter, light is
detected by two single photon detectors, thus emulating
a real MDI-QKD setup. Ideally, a tunable bandpass filter
should appear in each arm of the setup to limit the band-
width and hence the frequency chirp of each laser. For
experimental convenience, we use a single tunable band-
pass filter and two optical circulators to filter emissions
of both lasers simultaneously [28]. Each laser is attenu-
ated by more than 70 dB up to the single photon level
before interference. Including the built-in isolation (30
dB) in each laser diode and the circulator extinction ra-
tio of 50 dB, the total isolation between the light sources
FIG. 2. Schematics of the experimental setup. The shade
illustrate the spectral filtering using a single filter with the
help of two optical circulators. The same diagram is used for
modelling the effect of time jitter and frequency chirp on the
two-pulse interference visibility.
is greater than 150 dB. Considering each laser emitting
an optical power of ∼200 µW at 1 GHz, this level of isola-
tion ensures that the optical cross talk between the lasers
is less than 10−8 photons/pulse. We therefore conclude
the laser diodes are optically independent.
Gain-switching in the laser diodes is achieved elec-
trically by a superposition of a DC bias and a voltage
square wave clocked at 1 GHz. Temporal alignment of
the pulses, shown in Fig. 1(a), is achieved by tuning the
delay of Laser 2, which is electronically adjustable in
steps of 1 ps. Laser 1 is kept at room temperature, while
laser 2 is cooled to −9◦C to tune its central frequency
(193.47 THz) to approximately match Laser 1, as shown
in Fig. 1(b). The second order correlation functions at
0-delay are measured for lasers 1 and 2 and amount to
99.3± 1.0% and 99.6± 1.3%, respectively, suggesting the
Poisson statistics as expected for coherent state emission
[29]. Optical pulses from both lasers exhibit temporal
and spectral full widths at half maximum (FWHM’s)
of 30 ps and 70 GHz, respectively. Excluding the in-
fluence from the time jitter, which was measured to be
9.3 ps (FWHM), the laser pulses are far from Fourier-
transform limited. Gaussian transform limited pulses
of such duration correspond to a spectral broadening of
about 15 GHz [27]. The excessive spectral broadening
is attributed to laser frequency chirp, which requires a
proper theoretical description to understand the results
of the interference experiment in the presence of time
jitter.
We focus on the beam splitter and evaluate the co-
incidence counts registered by the two detectors. The
two optical pulses generated by the independent GS laser
diodes enter the beam splitter through inputs a and b.
The electric field at k = {a, b} and time t is:
Ek(t) =
√
I(t− tk) exp{2pii[ν(t− tk) +β(t− tk)2 +ϕk]},
(1)
where I(t) = exp{−t2/2τ2p}/(τp
√
2pi) is the temporal
profile of the laser pulse, assumed to be Gaussian, and
τp its temporal width; ν is the central frequency of the
3wavepackets; tk is the temporal distance of wavepacket
k from the beam splitter at time t; β is a parameter ac-
counting for frequency chirp, which is about 0.01 ps−2 in
semiconductor lasers [25]; ϕk is the (random) electromag-
netic phase of the pulses. We also define for later conve-
nience the time delay between the two pulses ∆t = tb−ta
and the phase difference ∆ϕ = ϕb − ϕa. The time delay
can be due to either systematic temporal misalignment
or emission time uncertainty.
At the beam splitter, the pulses are aligned to same
polarisation and interfere. The output intensities can
be calculated from Eq. (1) and the beam splitter rela-
tions [30]. After integrating over the finite response time
of the detectors, much longer than the pulse width, and
assuming a 50/50 beam splitter, we obtain for the in-
tensity at the output ports of the beam splitter, c and
d,
Ic,d = 1± cos(∆ϕ) exp[− (∆t)
2
8τ2p
(1 + 16β2τ4p )], (2)
where the +(-) sign is associated with the c (d) mode.
Figure 1(c) shows example traces of Ic and Id recorded
at the beam splitter output ports using a pair of fast pho-
todiodes as detectors, after having set optical attenuation
to 0 dB and spectral filtering to pass all frequency com-
ponents (see setup in Fig. 2). Photodiodes record com-
plementary outputs, as a result of energy conservation.
Peak intensities fluctuate because of the random phase
difference ∆ϕ in Eq. (2). Nearly complete constructive
and destructive interference is observable because of the
occasional perfect temporal alignment (∆t ≈ 0) of the
two wavepackets. Since we do not limit the frequency
chirp here, the observation of nearly complete interfer-
ence suggests that the two lasers have a similar chirped
profile. However, as we shall see, this is not sufficient to
guarantee a high visibility in two-pulse interference.
Most often ∆t 6= 0 because of the emission time jit-
ter. In this case, frequency chirp will prevent complete
interference and hence deteriorate the interference visi-
bility. The differential phase between two pulses is no
longer constant, but evolves as ∆ϕ(t) = ∆ϕ0 +2piβ∆t · t.
Crudely speaking, whenever the differential phase evolves
by more than 2pi, half of the optical wave interferes con-
structively and the other half destructively, resulting an
overall interference visibility approaching zero.
The average two-pulse interference visibility can be ob-
tained as V (2) = 1− Pcd, where Pcd ∝ Ic · Id is the (nor-
malized) coincidence rate seen by the two detectors under
the assumption of attenuated intensities [6]. After aver-
aging over the random phase difference ∆ϕ and under the
experimentally fulfilled condition of pulses attenuated at
the single photon level, we obtain the visibility as:
V (2) =
1
2
exp[− (∆t)
2
4τ2p
(1 + 16β2τ4p )]. (3)
It is worth remarking that the theoretical limit for the
interference visibility is 50% in this case, not 100%, be-
cause attenuated coherent states, not single photons, are
interfering at the beam splitter.
In Fig. 3, we plot the interference visibility as a func-
tion of temporal misalignment and frequency chirp. We
use τp = 12.7 ps, corresponding to an FWHM of 30 ps
for a Gaussian wavepacket. When both lasers are per-
fectly aligned and jitter free (∆t = 0), a visibility of
V (2) = 0.5 is obtained irrespective of the amount of
frequency chirp, as expected for perfectly indistinguish-
able, phase-randomized weak laser pulses. Similarly, in
the absence of frequency chirp (β = 0), the two-pulse
interference also exhibits high visibility as long as the
temporal misalignment is insignificant as compared with
the pulse duration. However, the visibility deteriorates
rapidly when both temporal misalignment and frequency
chirp are present. With a realistic temporal misalign-
ment (∆t = 10 ps) and frequency chirp (βσt = 70 GHz),
the interference visibility drops to ∼0.10, a value too low
for any practical applications.
As an example, low visibility reduces the secure key
rate of MDI-QKD. This is because visibility directly af-
fects the phase error rate in the protocol, thereby in-
creasing the privacy amplification cost. Using realistic
parameters for channel transmission of 0.2 dB/km and
measurement efficiency of 30%, a maximum secure key
rate (Rmax) of the order of 10 kbps can be attained
with a GHz-clocked MDI-QKD system over 100 km fiber
[31, 32]. Incidentally, this secure key rate is more than
two orders of magnitude greater than what has previ-
ously been reported in the literature [18–21]. However,
it will decrease rapidly with deterioration of the visibility.
In Fig. 3, we plot contour lines illustrating the achievable
secure key rates at corresponding interference visibilities.
With a slight drop of the visibility from 0.50 to 0.45, the
secure key rate is reduced to less than the half of Rmax.
It will reduce to around 10% of Rmax if the visibility is
less than 0.40. When the visibility is lower than 0.37, the
generation of a secure key is no longer possible. Hence,
high visibility interference is vital to maintain efficient
secure key generation in MDI-QKD.
Having described our theoretical model for two-pulse
interference visibility in relation to laser frequency chirp
and time jitter, and its effect on the MDI-QKD key
rate, we can now proceed and measure the real visibility
obtained from an MDI-QKD-like setup like the one in
Fig. 2, set in single photon counting mode. Specifically,
both lasers are equally attenuated to < 0.05 photons per
pulse and superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tors with ∼5% quantum efficiency are employed [33]
By setting the filter bandwidth to 2 THz, we record a
coincidence histogram as shown in Fig. 4(a). The sup-
pression at the zero delay corresponds to a visibility of
V (2) = 0.25. The visibility is vastly improved to 0.46 by
narrowing the filter bandwidth to 13.8 GHz, as shown in
4FIG. 3. Calculated second order interference visibility V (2)
as a function of frequency chirp (βσt) and temporal misalign-
ment (∆t) of interfering pulses. We assume a temporal width
of 30 ps (FWHM) for laser pulses. White lines indicate the
achievable secure bit rates of MDI-QKD, compared to the rate
Rmax achievable with perfect interference.
FIG. 4. The second-order interference visibility V (2) as a func-
tion of filter bandwidth. Measurements using a single laser
and theoretical calculation are also shown. Insets: Coinci-
dence traces for the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference measure-
ments are shown for two different bandwidths of (a) 2 THz
and (b) 13.8 GHz.
Fig. 4(b). We plot the interference visibility as a function
of the filter bandwidth in Fig. 4. Three different regions
can be distinguished in the data. In the first region with
the filter bandwidth greater than 70 GHz, the visibility
improves slowly when the filter narrows. In this region,
the filter rejects only the spontaneous background and
side-mode emissions, which are typically three orders of
magnitude weaker than the lasing mode. The visibility
improves from V (2) = 0.25 at 2 THz to 0.28 at 72.5 GHz.
FIG. 5. Measured (symbols) and simulated (solid line) inter-
ference visibility V (2) as a function of temporal misalignment
∆t.
Then the visibility improves rapidly when the filter starts
to limit the laser bandwidth until reaching a peak visibil-
ity of V (2) = 0.46 at 13.8 GHz. Note that this bandwidth
value is readily obtainable by using appropriately chosen
off-the-shelf telecom filters [34]. In the third region, the
visibility starts to deteriorate for filter bandwidths less
than 13.8 GHz.
We calculate the visibility as a function of the laser
bandwidth using the measured time jitter values and the
measured bandwidth-dependent pulse durations. The re-
sulting theoretical curves fit the experimental data with-
out any free parameters. As shown in Fig. 4, the model
has reproduced the visibility improvement in the interme-
diate bandwidth region whereas for small bandwidth it
shows a considerably higher visibility than actually mea-
sured. The discrepancy in the narrow bandwidth region
is attributed to imperfection in the measurement setup.
We use a single bandpass filter which has a finite back-
reflection ratio. The back-reflected light does not affect
the lasers, protected by attenuators and optical isolators,
but it can enter the 50/50 beam splitter and reach the
detectors, thus causing accidental coincidences that spoil
the interference visibility. To unveil the truly achievable
visibility, we have interfered laser pulses emitted by a sin-
gle laser diode. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer is aligned to interfere optical pulses of adjacent
clocks [12]. In this arrangement, the bandpass filter is
placed before the interferometer and the back-reflection
problem is thus avoided. The results are also plotted
in Fig. 4. This time, a visibility of 0.48 is recorded at
11.5 GHz, which agrees well with the predicted visibility
of 0.488. The small discrepancy is due to the imperfect
splitting ratio in the 50/50 beam-splitter, which has been
measured to be close to 53/47.
Figure 5 shows the interference visibility as a function
of systematic temporal misalignment (∆t) between two
lasers. Here, the bandpass filter is fixed to give a band-
5width of 13.8 GHz. On top of laser timing jitter, the
systematic misalignment further deteriorates the inter-
ference visibility. In the extreme case of large misalign-
ment (|∆t| > 45 ps), the optical pulses have little overlap
and the corresponding visibility approaches zero. Around
the optimal delay ∆t = 0, the visibility varies slowly with
the temporal misalignment. At a misalignment of 10 ps,
the visibility remains as high as 0.41, a value that is still
sufficient for positive key distillation in MDI-QKD. This
temporal tolerance is readily achievable through remote
optical synchronisation [16].
Our results are not limited to MDI-QKD and are use-
ful to other quantum information applications. For in-
stance, a fast random number generator could be envis-
aged if numbers are assigned to the complementary out-
comes shown in Fig. 1(c), improving the flexibility of ex-
isting solutions based on first-order interference [12, 35].
Optical interference could also be used to quantify side-
channel information in QKD implementations with mul-
tiple light sources. Currently information leakage is esti-
mated trough a series of ad hoc measurements based on a
few known degrees of freedom [36]. However information
leakage from unknown degrees of freedom, sometimes re-
ferred to as side channels, cannot be ignored. This se-
curity risk could be unveiled by a decrease in the visi-
bility of a multi-source interference experiment. Finally,
our demonstration that Fourier-transform limited pulses
are not necessary for high-visibility interference may al-
low weak coherent pulses to be tailored to interfere with
quantum light sources, providing a plethora of oppor-
tunities, for example, a hybrid quantum relay [37] that
bridges weak-pulse QKD and entangled photon pairs [38].
To summarise, we have demonstrated high-speed
phase-randomised coherent state sources that can exhibit
high visibility in two-pulse interference. The solution is
based on semiconductor gain-switched laser diodes and
characterized in their temporal and spectral properties.
This result is highly beneficial to the recent application
of MDI-QKD and to others exploiting similar princi-
ples. The achieved visibility of 0.46 (Fig. 4), limited by
back-reflection in the filter, can already guarantee more
than 50% of the maximum key rate in MDI-QKD. De-
spite high speed and narrow pulse width, the interference
visibility obtained from frequency-filtered gain-switched
laser diodes is comparable to, or better than, those
achieved with optical pulses carved from continuous-wave
lasers [18, 19, 21]. This suggests that this cheap and ef-
fective solution will play a major role in future quantum-
based applications.
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